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ABSTRACT: In this paper I will consider criticisms that have been raised against Broome’s 
first-order model of practical reasoning by Bratman, Brunero, and Høj. I will modify 
Broome’s exposition so that it is no longer vulnerable to these objections. The main 
modification I will make is that I will take the principle Broome dubs the “belief-
intention link” to express a pragmatic implicature instead of a material implication, 
on the basis of which implicatures the process of reasoning Broome describes reaches 
the conclusion-states Broome desires to reach. This makes a cognitivist account of at 
least some norms of practical rationality plausible.
KEYWORDS: Bratman, Broome, cognitivism, coherence, instrumental principle, prac-
tical rationality.
1. The Question: Why are we irrational when we fail to intend 
the means to our ends?
If I intend to x and believe that y is a means to x-ing, and yet I do not intend 
to y, then it seems that I am rationally criticizable, that I have violated some 
requirement of rationality. This requirement is usually called the Instrumen-
tal Requirement or the Instrumental Principle and can be given alternative 
wide-scope and narrow-scope formulations, respectively:
(IRW) Rationality requires that (if I intend to x and believe that y is a 
means to x-ing, then I should intend to y)
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(IRN) If I intend to x and believe that y is a means to x-ing, then rational-
ity requires that I should intend to y.1
Broome endorses wide-scope requirements in general, and in (2009) he 
attempts to give a cognitivist account of IRW. Cognitivism generally is the 
thesis that norms of practical rationality are to be accounted for in terms of 
norms of theoretical rationality, i.e., norms concerning doxastic states like 
belief. Broome attempts to show that the normativity involved in IRW can 
be accounted for by the normativity involved in norms that say, for example, 
that you should not hold inconsistent beliefs. It is because we should not vio-
late these norms on beliefs that we should not violate the norms of practical 
rationality, and that explains why we are irrational if we do so; specifically, in 
the case of the Instrumental Principle here presented, when we fail to intend 
what we believe to be the necessary means to our ends. In particular, Broome 
attempts to show that it is by satisfying wide-scope requirements on theoreti-
cal reasoning that we bring ourselves to satisfy IRW. Broome is not committed 
to this being true for all requirements of practical rationality. The subject of 
this paper is specifically Broome’s account of the instrumental requirement in 
order to defend it from criticisms it has attracted from Bratman (2009), Høj 
(2009), and Brunero (2005 & 2009).
Broome’s method of accounting for IRW is to describe a process of rea-
soning that satisfies it. The process Broome describes satisfies IRW by satisfy-
ing a wide-scope requirement of theoretical rationality. Broome’s focus on a 
process distinguishes it from other cognitivist accounts. Høj (2009: 2) marks 
this contrast:
Whereas Wallace and Harman’s goals were to provide direct cognitivist grounds 
for the normativity of the instrumental principle, Broome’s aim is to account 
for the process through which we come to satisfy this requirement of rationality. 
And given that Broome suggests that in order for the principle to be a require-
ment of rationality, it must be possible for an agent to come to satisfy that 
requirement through the process of reasoning, an account of how we come to 
satisfy the instrumental principle is–according to Broome–a way of supporting 
the suggestion that this principle is indeed a requirement of rationality.
There is something slightly dubious about what Høj says here. Although 
I doubt Høj means this, his final phrase makes it look like being able to 
describe a process of reasoning by which IRW is satisfied is merely evidence 
that IRW is a genuine requirement of rationality, without saying anything 
at all about whether or not it is a distinct norm of practical or instrumental 
1 These are simplifications of the real requirements that would have to take into account 
alternative means to the same end, and means – or the states that would come about by taking 
the means – that can come about without requiring that they be intended. Unless specified 
otherwise, a means should be taken as a necessary means – this is what Broome is discussing.
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rationality or to give an account of it. But the deeper problem with this 
phrase is that it is false – Broome makes no suggestion that “in order for the 
principle to be a requirement of rationality, it must be possible for an agent 
to come to satisfy that requirement through the process of reasoning” and in 
fact explicitly denies it, leaving unanswered the question whether there are 
requirements that cannot be satisfied by reasoning.
Some context may be useful here. Kolodny (2005) argues that “for any 
rational requirement on you, there must be a process of reasoning through 
which you can bring yourself to satisfy that requirement.” The view Høj at-
tributes to Broome seems the same. But Broome (2006: 2) quite explicitly 
rejects Kolodny’s arguments for this view, expressing agnosticism towards its 
conclusion, and in Broome (2009: 18) we see why, for he says:
The attitudes that can figure in your conscious reasoning must be ones you 
are conscious of, which is to say ones you believe you have. Conversely, if you 
believe you have an attitude that actually you do not have, the fact that you do 
not have it cannot impinge on your conscious reasoning.
The consequences are disturbing from a theoretical point of view. They leave 
us with an unpleasant dilemma. . . . [R]easoning cannot [always] bring you 
to satisfy Instrumental requirement [sic]. We shall have to conclude either that 
Instrumental requirement [sic] is not a genuine requirement of rationality, or 
alternatively that it is a genuine requirement but not one that reasoning can 
always bring you to satisfy.
There are some cases (where the reasoner believes that they have an intention 
but do not actually have that intention) where IRW cannot be satisfied by the 
process of reasoning Broome describes, so if Broome really held the view Høj 
attributes to him he would be forced to admit that the instrumental require-
ment is not a genuine requirement, yet we see Broome explicitly leaving this 
issue open. This being so, the process described by Broome does not show 
that the instrumental requirement is a genuine requirement, contrary to what 
Høj says.
What Broome does seem to say when he appeals to requirements that 
can be satisfied by reasoning is that his account of the normativity of IRW 
only needs to account for it insofar as it can be satisfied by reasoning. Where 
it cannot be so satisfied, no account is necessary. This coincides with a version 
of cognitivism where it is not required that the norms/requirements them-
selves be equivalent but only that the normative force of one be derivable 
from the normative force of the other. This would mean that the instrumen-
tal requirement has no normativity of its own, or at least that its normativity, 
if there is any, does no explanatory work in explaining why we are rational/
irrational when we obey/violate this requirement. By this means Broome re-
duces the normativity of the instrumental requirement to the normativity of 
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theoretical requirements while conceding that there are cases where all such 
theoretical requirements are satisfied but, because the reasoner does not have 
the intention they believe they have, IRW is not. This should become clear in 
the next section where the process is described.
2. The Model: Can practical reasoning be modelled as first-order 
theoretical reasoning?
In (2009) Broome rejects what he calls the second-order model of reasoning 
in favour of a first-order model.2 I will give the useful summarization from 
Bratman (2009: 31–32), who refers to a requirement of theoretical reasoning 
he calls BC (Bratman 2009: 14) where this can be defined as:
(BCW) Rationality requires that (if you believe that E and you believe 
that E will only occur if M, then you should believe M)
M is obviously here a necessary means. Armed with IR and BC (which I have 
called IRW and BCW and substituted into what follows) he shows how, by 
satisfying BC, Broome hopes to show that a reasoner can satisfy IR:
(1) Intention is not belief.
(2) It is not in general true that if you intend E you believe E.
This last is because (and here Broome and I agree)
(3) You can sometimes intend E but fail to believe you intend E; and in 
such cases you may well not believe E.
(4) But, if you do believe you intend E then you will believe E.
(5) And for your intention to E to enter into practical reasoning about 
means to E, you need to believe you intend E.
(6) So when your intention to E enters into your practical reasoning 
about means to E, you believe E.
(7) And it is this belief that E that provides the premise for your reason-
ing, namely: E.
2 In the second-order model reasoners reason by explicitly reflecting on and trying to 
comply with rational requirements, i.e., you reason that you should intend the means to your 
end precisely because you recognize this as a rational requirement and wish to make your 
beliefs and intentions coherent (Broome 2009: 3–4). This means that the rational require-
ments function as reasons for the reasoner to intend something or believe something. Kolodny 
(2007) argues that this way of getting a reason from a belief is bootstrapping and he denies 
that rational requirements give us reasons. Broome is more agnostic on this issue. It is natural, 
however, to avoid a second-order model that would commit him to such a view. Besides, he 
objects to the second-order model on the separate grounds that the second-order beliefs must 
likewise be the result of reasoning, which reasoning would then have to refer to third-order 
attitudes, and so on (Broome 2009: 4).
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(8) If you also believe that E only if M, and if these beliefs do not 
change, BCW requires that you believe M; and that is where your 
reasoning can lead.
(9) But if in the “background” you believe that M will obtain only if 
you intend M, then if you do arrive at the belief that M this will 
normally be by way of intending M. In satisfying BCW in this way 
you will satisfy IRW.
This, then, is Broome’s broadly cognitivist picture of reasoning from in-
tended ends to intended means. Broome wants to acknowledge, though, 
that it remains possible to intend E, believe that this requires both M 
and that you intend M, but falsely believe that you intend M. Broome 
grants that in such a case you fail to satisfy IRW, though you may well 
satisfy BCW. But, says Broome,
(10) In such a case “your false belief blocks any reasoning that can bring 
you to satisfy IRW.” So,
(11) Insofar as IRW is a rational demand that can be satisfied by reason-
ing it is demand [sic] that derives from BCW. Insofar as IRW seems 
to impose demands that go beyond what is imposed by BCW, these 
are not demands that can be satisfied by reasoning.
In this sense, it is BCW that is fundamental for a theory of practical rea-
soning from ends to means.
This requires some commentary.
There are basically 3 parts to this summary. Steps (1) to (7) are meant to 
justify “I believe E” as a premise that can be got from the intention to E and 
that is then used in the conscious reasoning that is modelled in steps (8) and 
(9). This reasoning goes:
a) I believe that E.
b) I believe that E only if M.
c) I should believe M.
Step (8b) is the means-end belief and (8c) is derived from (8a) and (8b) by 
BCW. Step (9) is meant to go from the belief that M to the intention that M. 
According to Bratman this is because you believe that M will obtain only if 
you intend M and so “if you do arrive at the belief that M this will normally 
be by way of intending M” (Bratman 2009: 32). Høj (2009: 6) breaks this 
into two stages: normally you would only form the belief that M by forming 
the belief that you intend that M, and normally you would only form the 
belief that you intend that M by forming the intention that M.
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What Broome (2009: 14) actually says is slightly different. He begins:
Straightforward theoretical reasoning would bring you to believe you will buy a 
ticket . . . . However, you are limited by a special constraint, which prevents you 
from doing straightforward theoretical reasoning. You believe you will not buy 
a ticket unless you intend to do so. Therefore, if you are rational, you cannot 
come to believe you will buy a ticket . . . unless you also come to believe you 
intend to buy a ticket.
Since we are prevented from doing “straightforward theoretical reasoning” 
we cannot go immediately from (8a) and (8b) to (8c); we are prevented from 
forming the belief that M because we do not now believe that we have the in-
tention that M (this is another application of BCW).
3 If, as stipulated in (8), 
the beliefs in (8a) and (8b) remain unchanged then the only way to satisfy the 
rational requirement is to form this belief too. So the belief that M and the 
belief that I intend that M are formed as part of the same step of reasoning, 
so to speak, or to put it slightly differently, the conscious reasoning has two 
conclusion-states which an unconscious process ensures match each other so 
as not to violate any requirements or introduce any incoherence. This seems 
similar to the first stage described by Høj although it is not clear whether Høj 
has realised that the belief that M in (8c) is not caused to occur before the 
belief that I intend that M is caused. Up to the formation of these conclu-
sion-states it is the theoretical requirement BCW that captures the normativ-
ity of the reasoning.
Broome continues that in normal circumstances “you cannot acquire 
the belief that you intend to buy a ticket except by actually acquiring the 
intention of buying one” (Broome 2009: 14), which is to say that the process 
by which you come to form the belief that you intend that M normally oper-
ates by causing you first to intend that M. This seems plausible and seems 
similar to the second stage described by Høj. However, there is a disanalogy 
with what Høj says because Høj argues as if both stages are likewise ways of 
avoiding violation of a requirement of theoretical rationality; this is true of 
the first stage, but not the second. The connection between the belief that I 
intend that M and intending that M is merely a causal dependency and not 
a normative constraint at all, whether theoretical or practical; it is not that 
intending that M is normatively required for forming the belief that I intend 
that M.
The third stage of Bratman’s summary consisting of steps (10) and (11) 
is Broome’s defence of the idea that IRW can in some sense be derived from 
BCW or more generally from requirements on theoretical reasoning despite 
the fact that a reasoner may be completely theoretically rational and yet be 
3 Practical reasoning has the same structure as the kind of theoretical reasoning Broome 
describes as putting the reasoning in reverse.
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instrumentally irrational because failing to have the appropriate intention. 
Broome (2009: 17–18) says that when this happens there is no way of get-
ting out of this situation by reasoning because the false belief blocks any 
such reasoning. You cannot, as Bratman would like to do, reason to an actual 
intention.4 He concedes that this leads to the dilemma already mentioned in 
the previous section that either the instrumental requirement is not a genuine 
normative requirement or there are cases where reasoning cannot satisfy it. 
The conclusion reached there was that IRW can derive its normative force 
from theoretical requirements as long as it gives the same critical verdict for 
all irrational states that we can get out of by a process of reasoning. We might 
wonder whether this is true (and we will question it later), but it does seem 
to fall out of Broome’s account.
Each stage will now be discussed separately. We may set a topic question 
for each stage.
STAGE 1: What is the relation between intending to x and the belief that 
you will x?
STAGE 2: Is this model applicable in every case where we would take an 
instrumental requirement to be applicable?
STAGE 3: Does this lose what is distinctly practical in practical reasoning?
There are other questions we might ask, e.g., about whether the reason-
ing represented in stage 2 is really good reasoning, but I will assume (and 
nobody seems to dispute) that it is good reasoning. Therefore, if we can get 
the premise required at (7), then we do seem able to reach the conclusion-
states of believing that M and believing that I intend that M. Obviously, this 
is where we need to start.
a. What is the relation between intending to x 
and the belief that you will x?
Broome’s view expressed in (1) to (3) contrasts with the view that intending 
something entails that you believe you will do it. Bratman (2009: 21) calls 
this the Strong Belief Thesis and offers the following kind of counterexample. 
Suppose that I intend to return some library books before the end of the day 
but, knowing from past evidence that I am likely to forget, I do not believe 
that I will return the library books. Broome’s response to these kinds of coun-
ter-examples seems a little ambivalent. On the one hand he seems to reject 
4 Bratman objects that we are not blocked because we can go through the same reason-
ing again and on this occasion the intention may be caused to occur. This is true, but a more 
charitable interpretation of Broome would ascribe to him the view that no process of reasoning 
can be guaranteed to result in an intention.
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the Strong Belief Thesis and replaces it with what he calls the belief-intention 
link (Broome 2009: 12):
Belief–intention link. If N believes that she herself intends that p, then, 
because of that, N believes that p.
On the other hand he seems to say that the intentions described in these 
counter-examples do not really qualify as intentions, although we call them 
such.
How would I best describe the library book scenario to myself or an-
other? I would not say, as I would if I were confident of success, “I am going 
to return the library books before the end of the day” or “I will return the 
library books before the end of the day” – I am not entitled to say this. I 
need to cancel the implicature that the books will actually be returned. Too 
weak would be “I will try to return the library books” or “I intend to try to 
return the library books” since this would imply that I may carry out my 
intention yet fail because of some obstruction, but if I carry out my inten-
tion to return the books there is every reason to suppose that I will succeed 
in returning the books (Holton 2008: 2–3). There is a difference between 
not believing that one will return the library books because one believes 
that something will prevent one carrying out the intention successfully and 
not believing it because one believes simply that one will not carry out the 
intention at all, possibly because at the time the intention should have been 
carried out one has (having forgotten) ceased to believe that one has the 
intention (Bratman 1987: 37–38). The first might be described as trying or 
intending to try, but the second is best described simply by saying “I intend 
to return the library books (but may not).” It is the second that seems to be 
reported in (3) which says that you may well not believe E because you fail 
to believe you intend E although you do in fact intend it. It does not seem 
to cover the case where you may not believe E because you think your at-
tempt to E may fail.
Broome (2009: 13) endorses this description of how I should describe 
this situation while simultaneously implying that it is not, strictly speaking, 
correct and that what I have is not an intention but a weaker kind of attitude 
that we have no word for and hence call (slightly inaccurately) by the name 
of ‘intention.’ He concedes that his account is thus limited to intentions for 
which the belief-intention link is true, and this seems to mean either that the 
instrumental requirement does not apply to these weaker intentions or that 
it does apply but in these cases a different account is needed. Both Bratman 
(2009: 21–22) and Høj (2009: 8–10) object that surely the norm of mean-
ends rationality is engaged in these cases; surely I am irrational if I do not 
reason about how to achieve an end I intend and form the intention to take 
the means to that end even if, in fact, I believe that I will forget about my 
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intention or believe that the means will not be successful (as long as I believe 
it will improve my chances).
The belief-intention link is meant to be a weaker, more inclusive princi-
ple than the Strong Belief Thesis. It is not immediately clear why. If intend-
ing x does not entail believing that x, why does believing you intend x entail 
believing that x? What difference does it make that you continue to believe 
that you intend x? Perhaps the idea is that by insisting that you believe that 
you have the intention you rule out as inapplicable those cases where you 
forget you have the intention, cases where you have the intention but do not 
believe that you have it. This limits the scope of the principle, as already said. 
But why should this be thought a reasonable thing to do?
Let us clear up a couple of preliminaries first. It might be wondered 
where this belief that you intend comes from in the first place. It comes 
simply from the fact that we are consciously reasoning about our intentions 
and beliefs, and being conscious of them is to say that we believe we have 
them. This does not mean that these second-order attitudes actually enter 
into our reasoning. The reasoning process as Broome presents it consists of 
saying things to yourself. Saying to yourself “I will return the library books” 
as an intention and not just as a predictive belief expresses both the intention 
to return the library books and the belief that I intend to return the library 
books, since I am not in a position to say sincerely that I intend to x unless 
this intention is one I believe I have. In saying it sincerely you are also ex-
pressing the corresponding predictive belief [i.e., the belief in (7)]. However, 
this seems to be an implicature rather than an entailment and as such can be 
cancelled by saying something like “I intend to return the library books (but 
may not)” or “I will try to return the library books.” We may not believe the 
predictive belief to be true, and when we do not we prefer not to say “I will 
___.” We may say “I intend ___,” but when we do there is the sometimes 
unspoken qualifier “but may not ___.”
Why, then, should we take the belief-intention link to be true? Accord-
ing to Høj (2009: 4–5) Broome’s solution is to insist that when we do express 
our intentions we do so by saying “I will x”, and the linguistic fact that this is 
the normal way in which we express our intentions out loud is evidence that 
the belief-intention link is true. Perhaps one should take this stipulatively as 
saying that only those intentions that can be expressed in the normal way 
are the subject matter of this account. This is what Broome (2009: 12–13) 
says:
You cannot sincerely express an intention to do something without believing 
you have that intention. Consequently, when you sincerely express an inten-
tion, you must believe you will do what you intend. That is why you are in a 
position to express this belief simultaneously.
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The evidence I offer for the existence of this belief-intention link is just that 
expressing an intention is also expressing a belief; both take the form of say-
ing the same indicative sentence. So you cannot express an intention without 
expressing a belief that you will do what you intend. And you cannot do that 
sincerely without having the belief.
The illative “consequently” does not seem at all obvious. The appeal to 
sincerity suggests that perhaps Broome believes that it is a sincerity condition 
of the speech act of expressing the intention to x that one believes that x, and 
that a speaker or reasoner would not be entitled to say this unless they believe 
they will do what they intend to do. This would be an attractive solution if 
there were such a sincerity condition. Unfortunately there is not: the sincerity 
condition for expressions of intention and for commissives in general is sim-
ply having the intention and not any belief that the intention will be fulfilled 
(Searle 1979: 14).
Nevertheless, I think there is something right about what Broome says. 
Certainly there is something at least a little paradoxical in saying “I intend 
to return the library books, but they will not be returned,” and this seems 
to be because if I say that I will do something, I usually do so with the 
intention to make it known to the listener that they can rely on its being 
done and coordinate their own intentions or joint intentions we may have 
together on that expectation. Similarly it may be important to my own 
plans that I take achieving what I intend (by some means or other) as read. 
It is not entailed that it will be done or that I believe that it will be done 
– Broome is wrong to present the link as an entailment – but there is an 
implicature. Like all implicatures it can be cancelled, as we have already 
seen, by saying something like “I intend to return the library books but I 
may not succeed.”
The interesting thing is, if we accept Broome’s idea that reasoning 
amounts to saying things to yourself, an implicature is enough to get to step 
(7), and once we have got that far, it has already been conceded that the rea-
soning in (8) and (9) is valid. This gives an answer for our topic question for 
stage 1: the relation between intending to E and the belief that you will E is 
the implicature from “I will E” to “E” or “E will be done.” In turn, this means 
that when we say to ourselves “I will E” we are entitled to say “E”. In saying 
this we can still be counted as reasoning if reasoning is a process of saying 
things to oneself, despite the lack of any deductive entailment.
But what about those cases where we would not be entitled to say “I will 
E”? That this account implies that we can only reason about what we can 
sincerely say to ourselves limits it unacceptably. Even if we accepted Broome’s 
claim (contra Bratman and Høj) that this reasoning does not need to satisfy 
rational requirements, it surely cannot be accepted that we cannot reason at 
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all, yet this seems to be a consequence of Broome’s model; at least, no practi-
cal reasoning seems possible, since this requires us to get from the belief that 
I intend that E to the belief that I will E, as expressed in the belief-intention 
link. Thus, intentions that do not satisfy the belief-intention link are not only 
outside the scope of this account, but do not seem able to initiate any reason-
ing which concludes in an intention. Broome (2009: 80) seems prepared to 
admit this. This brings us to our next topic question.
b. Is this model applicable in every case where we would take 
an instrumental requirement to be applicable?
Whether we call such tentatively held attitudes ‘intentions’ or not is less im-
portant than whether the norms at issue apply to them. Bratman and Høj 
say that they do and I am inclined to agree that this is correct. However, I 
think this is less of a problem for the first-order model than may be thought. 
Broome does not need to limit his account to intentions that satisfy the be-
lief-intention link; reasoning with weak intentions is simply to reason ex hy-
pothesi, just as we may construct and follow arguments whose premises we 
believe to be false. We do not need to actually be sincere in order to reason 
as if we are.
To say that an intention is weak is only to say that one is more easily 
disposed to cease having it, in which case, under normal circumstances, 
one will cease to believe that one has it. Let us look at the wording of 
(8): “If you also believe that E only if M, and if these beliefs do not change, 
BCW requires that you believe M.” The grammatical form is deceptive, 
for it makes BCW look like a narrow-scope requirement. In fact, is a 
wide-scope requirement, viz. “BCW requires that (if you also believe that 
E only if M, and if these beliefs do not change, you believe M).” So this 
conditional is satisfied if the beliefs do change due to weakness of the 
intention. In such a case we would not have (8c) as the conclusion-
state, but the model never actually said that you would. If they do not 
change, then the weakness of the intention is immaterial – a weak inten-
tion that does not change is on a par with a strong intention that does 
not change.
If this is correct then the problem of weak intentions is a pseudo-prob-
lem. There are still serious problems, however. There are timing issues, for 
surely I am already instrumentally irrational if I do not have coherent inten-
tions, even before I have the belief that I intend the end and even if I never 
form the belief that I have this intention, and the pressure to make myself 
instrumentally rational should begin as soon as I have this intention and the 
belief that I have the means to achieve it and not, as Høj (2009: 13–16) says 
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of Broome’s model, only after the intention and the means-end belief have 
been expressed, i.e., featured explicitly in the practical reasoning, or even later 
at the last moment that the means is still effective as a means. Although I am 
not necessarily irrational when I leave taking the means “to the last moment” 
it seems that I am under some rational pressure to take the means before 
then. Furthermore, suppose that I do have the intention to take the means 
yet I do not have coherent beliefs, which is to say that I satisfy IRW but not 
BCW. If I then lose that intention, then surely this is where I begin to be in-
strumentally irrational and under pressure to remedy that problem, and this 
is an additional problem and an additional pressure to that due to the fact 
that I am already violating a requirement of theoretical rationality (Brunero 
2009: 316–17).
Broome has already conceded that there are cases where the theoretical 
requirements are satisfied and instrumental requirements are not (because the 
belief that one intends the means is false) and, presumably, also vice versa. 
Now it seems he must also concede that even in cases where both types of 
requirement are satisfied, they can be satisfied at different times. Generally 
speaking, the instrumental requirement will be violated before the theoreti-
cal requirement is violated and satisfied after the theoretical requirement is 
satisfied.
Now, we could say that we are not aware of being in violation of the 
instrumental requirement unless we are conscious of being in an incoherent 
doxastic state, where this is brought about by being in violation of a theoreti-
cal requirement, and it is only then that we can purposely get out of this state 
by reasoning. Here we appeal to the idea that the normative force of the in-
strumental requirement can be captured by the normative force of theoretical 
requirements even if the instrumental requirement itself is not captured by 
theoretical requirements. On the other hand, perhaps this idea is accumulat-
ing too many counter-intuitive consequences.
This does, however, mean that there are some quite straightforward im-
plicatures that we can point to: “I am instrumentally (ir)rational (concern-
ing my intending a certain end and means)” has as an implicature “I am 
theoretically (ir)rational (concerning my beliefs about intending that end and 
means)” and in explaining why I am (ir)rational I can appeal only to inten-
tions and beliefs I am conscious of and believe that I have. This is a very 
strong implicature and not easily cancellable, since my only evidence of be-
ing instrumentally irrational is by being theoretically irrational. The converse 
implicature from “I am theoretically (ir)rational” to “I am instrumentally 
(ir)rational” is weaker because it can be cancelled by appending “but there 
are abnormal cases where my belief that I have an intention is not caused by 
having that intention.”
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c. Does this lose what is distinctly practical in practical reasoning?
I have now had to appeal to implicatures twice, firstly in the belief-intention 
link, and secondly to link instrumental rationality and practical rationality. 
The first, I think, is fairly innocent, the second more troublesome, because 
it seems that what Broome has given is less a theory of instrumental rational-
ity than an empirical test or heuristic of when its requirements are violated. 
An implicature is not sufficient for a theoretical reduction, yet this is appar-
ently what we need and what cognitivism is attempting to give. Cognitivism 
does not account for the unique role intentions play in our efforts to form 
coherent plans; this is a distinct feature of practical norms, or so it could be 
argued.
It should also be noted that Broome conceives requirements of rational-
ity as coherence requirements: as long as we are in the right psychological 
state, it doesn’t matter how we got there. Brunero (2005: 8) complains that 
on Broome’s account
[I]t does not seem to be the case that if this agent were to intend the neces-
sary means, he would thereby be instrumentally rational; the formation of the 
intention [for the means] is not sufficient for instrumental rationality. Suppose 
the intention [for the means] is weak-willed. Suppose I see no reason to borrow 
money, perhaps because it would put me too far into debt, but intend to do so 
anyway. So, my intentions are consistent.
I believe that I have the intention to buy a boat, I believe that borrowing 
money is necessary for me to buy a boat, and I have the intention to borrow 
money. It is not clear whether or not I have this last intention because this has 
been brought about by practical reasoning, i.e., through BCW. In any case, 
Brunero asks us to suppose that I see no reason to borrow money when he 
continues:
But suppose that even though I see no reason to borrow money, I don’t see that I 
have no reason to buy the boat. I fail to see the relevant inferential connections. 
On Broome’s view, I would be instrumentally rational since my intentions are 
consistent.
Is Brunero’s complaint here that Broome’s account fails to take into account 
beliefs that tell against intending the necessary means to an intended end? 
This might be true, but the instrumental principle does not claim to be say-
ing what is rational all-things-considered, so this criticism seems to miss its 
mark. Or is it that I do not necessarily have the intention to take the neces-
sary means because I have the intention to take the end, that is to say, I have 
failed, in a quite general sense and not just with respect to the fact that I see 
no reason to borrow money, to grasp the inferential connections? This seems 
more to the point.
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According to Brunero, that I see no reason to borrow money should (but 
in Broome’s account does not) mean that I am not instrumentally rational 
when I have this combination of attitudes. The passage continues:
But this seems too quick. If I were instrumentally rational, I would see that 
since I have no reason to borrow money, I have no reason to buy the boat. 
Correct instrumental reasoning would start from the premise that I have no 
reason to borrow the money, and conclude that I have no reason to buy the 
boat. And if I fail to see the relevant inferential connections here, it seems that I 
would be exhibiting a form of instrumental irrationality, even if my intentions 
are consistent. So, having consistent intentions does not suffice to make one 
instrumentally rational.
Brunero’s point seems to be that I should cease to have the intention to buy 
the boat given that I see no reason to take the necessary means. This assumes 
quite generally (and, I think, correctly) that failing to see the relevant inferen-
tial connections constitutes a form of instrumental irrationality.
If Brunero’s point is that our intentions should be formed in the right 
way, by grasping the inferential connections between our intention for the 
end and our intention for the necessary means, then I agree, and would add 
that without such a historical condition Broome’s account loses something 
distinctive about practical rationality. True, Broome describes a process of 
reasoning, but this only means that we are rationally required to have those 
attitudes that we would have if they resulted from this reasoning; Broome 
does not pretend to be giving a process-requirement. I propose that this 
problem can be solved if we make the principle link our intentions to our 
intentional actions, for to count as intentional an action must be caused not 
only by an intention but by the practical syllogism as a whole.5 I will return 
to this.
If Brunero’s point is that, granted that our intentions are formed by the 
process Broome describes, there should be another process – from the belief 
that there is no reason to borrow money to ceasing to have the intention to 
buy the boat – that instead tells us what we would be instrumentally rational 
5 In another paper, I propose that the conditional that we should make true is a counter-
factual one, where this is supposed to capture the idea of having a belief because we have other 
beliefs. This was given as an account of the rational requirement of modus ponens; I have yet 
to extend this approach to requirements of practical rationality. Here, I am simply bypassing 
the question of whether intentions that are not conclusion-states but are the same as those 
that would be conclusion-states, are rational or not; if they are not conclusion-states, then we 
do not act intentionally when we act upon them because of “causal deviance” in the practical 
reasoning itself. I make no attempt here to solve, or even elucidate further upon, the thorny 
issue of causal deviance – I simply assume that intentional action has been defined so as to 
avoid this problem. By addressing this problem in the definition of intentional action, I avoid 
addressing it in the definition of practical rationality.
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in doing, then we must distinguish two cases, which Brunero confusingly 
combines.
The first is where, having engaged in practical reasoning and foreseeing 
negative side-effects of taking the means that outweigh the positive aspects 
of the intended end, the rational thing to do is to reject the end, that is to 
say, because borrowing money would put me too far into debt I should 
cease to have the intention to buy the boat. But this seems to be just an-
other way of satisfying the wide-scope requirement BCW, which it should 
be remembered had as part of its antecedent that the belief that you will E 
(achieve the end you intend) should not change. So the course that Brun-
ero says is rational also counts as rational on Broome’s account; however, 
Broome’s account does not rule out satisfying the wide-scope requirement 
in the alternative way, by intending to borrow the money, as irrational; we 
are still instrumentally rational despite the fact that we see no reason to 
borrow the money, as long as we do not actually cease to believe that we 
will buy the boat and believe that borrowing money is a necessary means 
for doing this, and there does not seem to be any requirement that tells us 
not to have this intention. It is not equally instrumentally rational, Brunero 
seems to say, since it would conflict with the belief that we should not put 
ourselves further into debt. However, it is not obvious to me that, even if 
you are aware of the inferential connection, that you should be rationally 
required to cease having the intention. Perhaps in some cases this may be 
an instance where one cannot get from “I intend to buy a boat” to “I will 
buy a boat,” but this reduces to the case where we satisfy the conditional 
by ceasing to have the belief. Then, supposing instead the implicature from 
“I do not intend to borrow money” or “I intend not to borrow money” to 
“I will not borrow money” we have another rational requirement, whose 
conditional is made true this time by making the consequent true, that is 
to say, by not intending to take any necessary means to borrowing money.” 
True, this will still not deliver the verdict of irrationality to intending to 
borrow the money that Brunero seems to want, but I am not convinced 
that it should. While I still have the intention to buy the boat and believe 
that borrowing the money is a necessary means, I would be instrumentally 
irrational if I do not have also the intention to borrow the money. This does 
not rule out both intentions being nullified by an intention not to borrow 
money, though I do not think “nullified” here necessarily means that we 
should be required not to have them, but only that they should not be acted 
on. This is another reason why a principle linking intention to intentional 
action should be helpful.
This is not, however, the problem I think Brunero wants to pose. Bru-
nero describes a second case where my failing to have a reason to intend the 
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means is not explained by its negative side-effects but is explained instead as 
weakness of will (that this puts me further into debt is then an irrelevance). 
Brunero complains that although the intentions are consistent, because I am 
not sufficiently motivated to actually take the means, rather than just to in-
tend it, I am not instrumentally rational. It should be noted here that by 
putting the principle as a wide-scope conditional, Broome deliberately avoids 
saying that we are rationally required to intend the necessary means. Yet in-
tending the necessary means is at least one way of being rational, on Broome’s 
account, but Brunero says that it is irrational – no account should tolerate it. 
The instrumentally rational thing to do, Brunero seems to say, is to cease to 
intend the end.
I find this rather peculiar; surely rationality should attempt to overcome 
weakness of will, or at least consider it to be rationally criticizable, rather than 
use it as a premise. It would be a strange principle of instrumental rationality 
indeed that said that we should not intend ends for which our intention to 
take the means is weak-willed. The plausibility of Brunero’s claim depends, in 
fact, on the negative side-effect after all, not the weakness of will.
Yet I agree with the general point that it is not enough to have the inten-
tion but that it must have been formed in the right way, and claim further 
we can handle this by switching the focus to intentional actions, for to be 
intentional is to have been brought about in the right way, i.e., caused in a 
non-deviant way by an intention inferentially connected to and non-devi-
antly caused by desires and beliefs that I have.
Elaborating, instrumental rationality does not end with having the right 
intentions but in performing the right actions. We may have coherent inten-
tions and yet still be instrumentally irrational because we did not form the 
intention in the right way, i.e., as the conclusion-state of a process of reason-
ing. We are not instrumentally rational when it is formed in the wrong way 
because when we act on such an intention we do not act intentionally, and it 
is only our intentional actions, and perhaps those unintended but foreseen, 
that are subject to rational criticism; when we fail to act on such an inten-
tion we are vulnerable to the criticism of weakness of will, but we are not so 
vulnerable when the intention is formed in the wrong way. The drunk who 
mouths rational or ethical principles but fails to follow them because failing 
to understand them or see their normative force is not being irrational be-
cause he is not engaging in reasoning at all, except perhaps as a sham; rather 
he is being arational.
Why is such an action non-intentional? After all, the action has an in-
tention as a causal antecedent, or so it may be supposed. If we adopt a causal 
theory of action, isn’t this sufficient to make the action intentional? Actually, 
I know of no causal theory of action that would say that this action was inten-
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tional. By an “intention” what they typically mean is whatever issues from a 
practical syllogism. There is a causal and conceptual connection between the 
intentional action and the practical reasoning; strictly speaking, one cannot 
act intentionally without its resulting from a (non-deviant) process of reason-
ing, and if Broome’s model of reasoning is correct, this means that whenever 
I act intentionally it is because BCW is satisfied and that the normative ques-
tion is: what process of reasoning is correct given an intention and means-end 
belief I believe myself to have?
Of course, the process of reasoning Broome describes does not always 
end in the intention but sometimes stops at the belief that one has the inten-
tion, and in these cases IRW is not satisfied but BCW is, as already said. What 
is instrumentally rational in this situation in terms of how we should act? 
Let us consider Brunero’s example: supposing that I believe that I have the 
intention to borrow money but do not in fact have this intention, am I act-
ing rationally if I borrow money and irrationally if I fail to borrow money? If 
I borrow money then this can only be because something else has motivated 
me to borrow money and not because I thereby satisfy a rational requirement, 
since my borrowing money is not connected in any way with the practical 
syllogism initiated by my intention to buy a boat without the causal media-
tion of the intention that, when everything works perfectly, is its conclusion-
state. And if I do not borrow money then I believe that I am not borrowing 
money, and this seems to puts me under rational pressure, as Høj calls it, to 
make (8c) true by borrowing money. It is not so much my lack of an inten-
tion to borrow money but my failure to actually borrow money that creates 
this pressure.
If this is right, then it seems that the instrumental requirement should be 
(IR*) If I intend to x and believe that y is my preferred means to x-ing, 
then I should intentionally x by intentionally y-ing.
This is to be read as a wide-scope rational requirement: you are rationally re-
quired to take what you believe to be your best means towards your intended 
end. If the means is believed to be necessary then you must be irrational if 
you do not act on the intention to take that means, for such a means would 
be a part of whatever is your preferred means. If you take a means that is not 
your preferred means but is still sufficient for the end then perhaps it would 
be too harsh to call this irrational, but still you would not be as rational as 
you could be.
Whenever you do not act on what you believe to be a means (of any 
description) I would still consider you to have violated the rational require-
ment, though it might be all-things-considered rational to violate such re-
quirements. In fact, when taking your preferred means you will ipso facto 
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be violating requirements to take alternative means, since I believe that you 
actually have intentions, at least dispositionally, to take any sufficient means. 
But your intention for your preferred means is what it is most rational to 
act upon, for otherwise you would be deliberately and consciously choosing 
what you believe to be sub-optimal.
There is much more that I could say at this point about what inten-
tions it is rational to have and how they interact with each other, but this is 
outside the scope of this paper. It is enough to note here that (IR*) includes 
a historical condition in the concept of acting intentionally, for one does not 
act intentionally except as the result of (non-deviant) practical reasoning, and 
Broome’s account tells us how practical reasoning should be in order to be 
rational.
3. Conclusion
The Strong Belief Thesis is false. The belief-intention link is false. Yet some-
thing like the belief-intention link, with a pragmatic implicature in the place 
of a material implication, is true, and, perhaps surprisingly, this is enough 
to provide the reasoner with the predictive belief that he will carry out his 
intention successfully as a premise, even, also perhaps surprisingly, when he 
does not believe that he will carry out his intention successfully. Our reason-
ing is not limited to what we sincerely believe or intend but can be carried 
out ex hypothesi, as it were. This gives Broome’s model more scope and ver-
satility than Bratman and Høj, and probably Broome himself, thinks. All 
that it relies upon is the idea of practical reasoning, or indeed reasoning as 
such, as enough like internal speech that we cannot only say what we think 
but think what we say. In the cases where the implicature is cancelled or 
otherwise to be considered unsafe, the reasoning cannot properly get started 
and either we never have the beliefs that form the antecedent of the rational 
requirement in the first place, in which case the rational requirement does 
not apply, or we have them but then cease having them, in which case the 
rational requirement does apply but is satisfied when the antecedent be-
comes false.
Practical reasoning as such ends in the belief that I will carry out my 
means-end intention and the belief that I intend to carry out my means-end 
intention. Providing (as the conditional says) that my premise-beliefs remain 
unchanged this is the only way to make my beliefs coherent. This does not, 
however, necessarily make my intentions coherent – satisfying the require-
ments on the beliefs does not guarantee satisfying the requirements on the 
intentions, which is to say that the instrumental requirement does not have 
the same extension as the theoretical requirements. Nevertheless, it is true 
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that it is only by satisfying the requirements on the beliefs that we can by 
reasoning bring ourselves to satisfy the instrumental requirement and only, I 
argued further, by violating the requirements on the beliefs that we can be 
led to believe (sometimes falsely) that the instrumental requirement is likewise 
violated. Because of this I tentatively suggested that the normative force of 
the instrumental requirement could be given in terms of the normative force 
of theoretical requirements even though they differed in extension, and this 
was sufficient for a broadly cognitivist account of the instrumental require-
ment.
However, I investigated the possibility mentioned by Broome that the 
instrumental requirement is not, strictly speaking, a genuine rational require-
ment, and I started to look around for alternatives that still seemed to capture 
the normativity of practical reasoning. This was (IR*) which connected in-
tending the end and actually intentionally performing the action (as opposed 
to forming the intention to perform it) conducive to achieving the end. An 
intentional action is conceptually and causally, rather than normatively, con-
nected to the intention to perform it and to the practical reasoning from 
which that intention emerges. Because of this, I think that Broome’s model 
works as a cognitivist account of (IR*). 
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